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Abstract
This paper presents two alternative payment systems to reduce hospital ine¢ ciency. In
both systems, one part of the payment is xed ex ante and allows for observable patient
and hospital heterogeneity. The rst system is a mixed payment that retrospectively re-
imburses unobservable hospital heterogeneity specied by hospital xed e¤ects, but does
not reimburse costs due to transitory moral hazard. The second system sets a prospective
payment for all the non-observable characteristics, without reimbursing cost deviations
due to either transitory moral hazard or hospital specic e¤ects. The advantage of the
rst payment system is that it creates incentives to reduce transitory moral hazard while
guaranteeing high quality of hospital services. Econometric estimates are performed on a
sample of 7,314 stays for acute myocardial infarction observed in 36 French public hospitals
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over the period 1994 to 1997. Transitory moral hazard is far from negligible: its standard
error is about 30 % of the standard error we estimate for hospital xed e¤ects (perma-
nent unobservable heterogeneity). Simulations show that a cost reduction of about 20 %
can be expected from implementation of a payment system which allows for permanent
unobserved heterogeneity and eliminates only transitory moral hazard.
JEL classication: C23, H51, I18
Keywords : Hospital costs, Prospective Payment System, moral hazard, unbalanced
panel data.
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1 Introduction
This paper proposes a payment system that creates incentives to increase hospital e¢ ciency
when hospitals are heterogeneous, without reducing quality of care.
In most Western European countries, a global budget system was introduced for cost
containment purposes in the late 70s or early 80s. In these countries, most hospitals
are public or publicly nanced. The global budget system is still widely used in many
European countries. It is also applied in Switzerland and in the USA for the hospitals
managed by the Department of Veterans A¤airs.
This method of payment consists of an annual budget xed in advance which does not
vary with the volume of services delivered. It has a number of drawbacks: underservice, risk
selection or ine¢ ciency. The type of drawbacks depends on whether the budget constraint
is hard or soft. At present, there is growing pressure to reform hospital reimbursement
systems through the introduction of a Prospective Payment System per DRG. In France,
a gradual introduction of a PPS is planned for 2004-2005. This study explores di¤erent
optimal reimbursement systems for heterogeneous hospitals as an alternative to the current
global budget regime in France.
However, the implications of this paper are not restricted to the French case and go
beyond the scope of hospital payment systems. Our approach could be applied to other
areas of health care nancing. We show how to identify a certain component of moral
hazard, one that can have a sizeable impact on cost variability. Our identication method
can be applied in situations where there is controversy about the sources of cost variability
and the respective roles of ine¢ ciency versus legitimate permanent heterogeneity.
An example in the USA is the controversy regarding the use of Adjusted Average Per
Capita Cost (AAPCC) to calculate Medicare Managed Care Reimbursement. AAPCC
is based on a blend of risk adjusted rates and of average expenditures computed at the
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local level. Wennberg et al. (2002) observe that Medicare spending based on AAPCC
varies widely between regions. For instance, the di¤erence in lifetime Medicare spending
between a typical sixty-ve-year-old in Miami and one in Minneapolis is more than $50,000.
The variations persist even after di¤erences in health are corrected for. The controversy
is about the reasons for the observed di¤erence: is it due to moral hazard or to other
di¤erences that are not captured by risk adjusted rates ? Using our method, it would
be possible to isolate one component of moral hazard and e¢ ciency could be improved
by an appropriate method of payment, while still reimbursing a part of unexplained cost
heterogeneity between regions.
The theoretical foundations of a fully prospective payment system per stay have been
dened by the yardstick competition model of Shleifer (1985). However, this model is based
on rather unrealistic assumptions: homogeneity of hospitals, homogeneity of patients for
the same pathology, xed quality of care. Many studies have pointed to possible negative
e¤ects of careless implementation of a PPS, namely patient selection and lower care quality
(Newhouse (1996)).
In order to avoid these drawbacks, many authors have advocated a mixed payment
system, combining a lump sum and the actual cost. However, such a system is rather
di¢ cult to put into practice: its specication can depend on unobservable variables or
functions. This leads to questions that we take up in the case of France. How can we
identify the costs corresponding to e¢ cient activity ? To what extent should patient and
hospital heterogeneity be allowed for in a payment system?
Drawing on Shleifers theory of yardstick competition, we develop an econometric model
where hospital variability is explained by patient and hospital characteristics. From the
regulators perspective, some of these characteristics are observable and some are not. We
propose two alternative payment systems in order to reduce hospital ine¢ ciency.
We use a three dimensional nested database of 7,314 stays for acute myocardial in-
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farction observed in 36 French public hospitals over the period 1994 to 1997. Information
is recorded at three levels: stays are grouped within hospitals and hospitals are observed
over several years. The structure of our panel data allows us to identify one component of
unexplained cost variability: short term moral hazard.
This article is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the data. In section 3,
which is devoted to the theoretical background, we propose an extension of Shleifers basic
model and dene an optimal payment rule. The specication of the cost function is given
in section 4, which shows how we identify some components of unexplained cost variability
and denes our two payment methods. Our results are presented in section 5, together
with the methods and specication tests. In section 6, we simulate the implementation of
our two payment methods and evaluate the potential budget savings. Section 7 concludes.
2 Description of the data
We have at our disposal a sample of 7,314 stays for acute myocardial infarction (AMI)
observed in 36 French public hospitals from 1994 to 1997. In France, public1 hospitals
account the large majority of total admissions (2/3 of admissions for AMI). Our sample
was extracted from the PMSI2 cost database. Classication of stays by Diagnosis Related
Group (DRG) is performed on the basis of diagnoses and procedures implemented during
the stay. In order to obtain a high degree of homogeneity in pathologies, we selected
patients who where at least 40 years old with acute myocardial infraction (AMI) as the
main diagnosis and grouped in the same DRG: uncomplicated AMI (DRG 179).
For each stay, we have information about the cost of the stay, secondary diagnoses,
procedures implemented, mode of entry into the hospital (coming from home or transferred
1 In France and in this article, the term public hospitalsmeans hospitals belonging to the public sector
and most of private-not-for-prot hospitals.
2PMSI stands for Programme de médicalisation des systèmes dinformations, which collects information
about hospital activity.
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from another hospital), mode of discharge (return home or transfer), length of stay, age
and gender of the inpatient.
The database gives access to rich, detailed information about stays. However, we cannot
follow the same inpatient through successive hospital stays. There is no information about
the patients quality of life after the stay, about readmission just after the observed stay,
about infections contracted during the stay. In addition, we have no information about the
quality of services provided in terms of comfort or alleviation of pain. Participation in the
cost database program is voluntary for hospitals and the number of participating hospitals
is limited. They consent to give detailed information about their costs, which means that
they must have accounting systems that enable them to provide such information.3
Our panel data exhibit a rather complex structure. Information is recorded at three
levels. The panel is unbalanced in several dimensions: not only does the number of stays
recorded vary across hospitals for a given year but also the length of the observation period
varies across hospitals.
2.1 Patients and hospitals
Together with drug therapy (aspirin, beta blockers, etc.), uncomplicated AMI patients
(DRG 179) can receive various treatments such as thrombolytic drugs, cardiac catheteri-
zation (hereafter denoted as CATH) and percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty
(PTCA). Catheterization is a specialized procedure used to view the blood ow to the
heart in order to improve the diagnosis. Angioplasty (PTCA) appeared more recently
than bypass surgery. It is an alternative, less invasive procedure for improving blood ow
in a blocked artery.
3Using an exhaustive database of AMI patients with no information about costs, we have carried out
a comparative analysis of patient characteristics and procedures implemented. The results show that our
data can be considered representative of AMI stays in French hospitals.
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In France, the use of an innovative procedure such as catheterization or angioplasty
does not lead to classication of a stay into a specic DRG.4 These innovative procedures
are most often performed within DRG 179: 76.1 % of CATHs and 82.8 % of PTCAs. Since
they do not lead to classication in a specic DRG, these costly procedures would not lead
to a specic payment under a prospective payment system. A payment system which does
not take these procedures into account would therefore penalise the innovative hospitals
which use them and give hospitals incentives to select patients.
Basic features of the data are presented in table 1. Most of the patients are men
(73.8%). They are rather young. 89 % of patients come from home. 64 % of discharged
patients return home and 36 % are transfered to another hospital.5 Catheterization is
performed for 38 % of the stays classied in DRG 179 and angioplasty in 12 %
Stays are recorded for 36 hospitals over the period 1994-1997 (table 2). A sizeable
proportion of hospitals never perform catheterization or angioplasty. These procedures
require specic skills and high-tech facilities. For a given year, a hospital is considered to
be innovative (INNOV) if it has performed catheterization for at least 2 % of the stays or
at least one angioplasty. A hospital can be non-innovative one year and perform high-tech
procedures the year after. On average over the four years, 60% of hospitals are classied
as innovative and these hospitals account for 71.5 % of the recorded stays.
To complete our database, we have also recorded information about hospital type from
the SAE survey.6 There are three types of hospitals: a CHR (Centre Hospitalier Regional)
is a public teaching hospital with research activities; PRIV stands for a private not-for-
prot hospital (these hospitals have only recently been subject the global budget system
4 In the US classication, stays with angioplasty are grouped in a specic DRG (DRG 112).
5AMI with death are grouped in another DRG (GHM 180). The average death rate for all AMI patients
is 9 %.
6The Statistique Annuelle des Etablissements de santé (SAE) is an annual survey which covers all
French public hospitals.
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and only partially so); PUB refers to other public hospitals.7 All the CHR and most of the
PRIVs are innovative hospitals.
Table 4 shows correlation coe¢ cients between hospital type, innovative hospitals and
averaged indicators computed at the hospital-year level (95 observations). CHRs are inno-
vative and have a low rate of discharge through transfer to another hospital. Private not
for prot hospitals (PRIVs) are characterized by a high rate of use of innovative proce-
dures and a high rate of admissions through transfers. Other public hospitals are rather
non innovative. Patient ows towards innovative hospitals appear clearly in (i) the posi-
tive correlation coe¢ cients we nd between admission rates through transfers and CATH
or PTCA rates; (ii) the negative correlation coe¢ cients we nd between discharge rates
through transfers and CATH rates.
2.2 Costs
Table 5 gives average costs. Average cost per stay is equal to 4,198 e with a standard
error of 2,863 e. On average, a stay is more costly when an innovative procedure has been
implemented. As concerns hospital characteristics, stays are more expensive in teaching
and in private not-for-prot hospitals. Stays are also costlier in innovative hospitals.
2.3 Historical context
In France, public hospital budgets have been based on a global budget system for more
than ten years, including the years 1994-1997 that we study. A complete information sys-
tem which classies inpatient stays by DRG has been set up, but a PPS has not been
implemented. No reform of nancing was undertaken from 1994 to 1997 (a gradual in-
troduction of a PPS is planned for 2004-2005). Budgets have no direct link to the actual
7The SAE survey provides other indicators on hospitals, such as the number of beds, the occupation rate
of beds, the diversication of activities within hospitals. However, the high number of missing observations
makes a complete descriptive analysis impossible. On the basis of a restricted number of observations, we
nd that CHRs are large hospitals with highly diverse activities. On the other hand, private not- for- prot
hospitals (PRIVs) concentrate on a small number of activities.
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production of hospitals. Hospitals are managed by salaried administrators and do not keep
the gains resulting from cost reduction e¤orts. In practice, the actual budget depends on
the outcome of negotiations between the regulator and the hospital manager. In addition,
hospitals are subject to a more or less soft budget constraint. This regulation leads to
inequity and ine¢ ciency in the allocation of ressources (Mougeot (1999)).
ici
3 Theoretical background
The models used to study hospital payment systems are devoted to the general problem
of local monopoly regulation. They consider the theoretical framework of an agency rela-
tionship between the regulator and the hospital, where the regulator has poor information
about the cost reduction e¤ort provided by the hospital manager (moral hazard). For
a particular disease, one assumes that the cost of one stay in a hospital h is given by:
Ch = ah   eh, where ah and eh are private information of a hospital. ah is a technology
parameter which represents the hospitals cost characteristics. It is a decreasing function
of hospital productivity. eh represents the managers e¤ort to reduce cost. The higher
the e¤ort provided, the lower the moral hazard. A hospital exerting e¤ort level eh incurs
a disutility denoted by '(eh): '(:) is a continous function with '0(:) > 0 and '00(:) < 0:
The services provided by hospital h generate a surplus Sh > 0. In return, the regulator
compensates the hospital through a monetary transfer Ph. Hospitals are supposed to keep
the rent earned through cost-reducing e¤orts and to face a hard budget constraint. Thus,
each hospital h chooses its level of e¤ort in order to maximise its utility given by :
Uh = Ph   '(eh)  Ch
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Each hospital is supposed to be a local monopoly. One assumes that there is no collusion
between hospitals. The regulator has to dene the levels of transfers which maximise social
welfare subject to the constraint that hospitals must not be in state of bankruptcy ( takes
distortions from taxation into account):
Max
X
h
(Sh + Uh   (1 + )Ph); subject to : Uh > 0 8 h
3.1 The yardstick competition model
A prospective payment system (PPS) leads hospitals to exert the rst-best level of e¤ort
and to have a balanced budget (with no rent and no decit). A PPS is a xed price
contract. Since the payment is a lump-sum dened irrespective of actual cost, it gives the
hospital a perfect incentive for cost reduction ('0(e) = 1). At this stage, the problem
is solved in part only. Indeed, ah is a private information of the hospital: the level of
the lump-sum xed by the regulator can lead the hospital to bankrupty or generate rents.
Thus, the problem of the regulator is to nd the level of payments which is equal to the
cost arising when the hospital is e¢ cient.
The yardstick competition model (Shleifer (1985)) solves the problem of informational
asymetries by assuming that the technology parameters are all identical between hospitals:
ah = a 8h. In this case, di¤erences in costs are only caused by moral hazard:
Ch = a  eh (1)
The yardstick competition scheme consists in o¤ering to each hospital a rule of payment
dened on the basis of the average costs observed for all other hospitals than h at the end
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of the year. The payment rule is:
Ph = '(e
) + Ch; where Ch =
P
k 6=h
Ck
H   1 : (2)
H is the number of regulated hospitals.
Here, Ch is dened so as not to be inuenced by Ch: the resulting payment is equivalent
to a xed price contract. Since the payment rule is announced at the beginning of the year,
the average Ch is ex post equal to the cost corresponding to the rst-best level of e¤ort:
Ch = a  e = Ch; 8 h
Transfers Ph are such that each hospital breaks even:
Ph = a  e + '(e): (3)
Expression (3) shows that Ph is a lump-sum equal to the level of cost corresponding to an
e¢ cient activity. In other words, Ph is equal to the level of costs of a hospital when there
is no moral hazard. Given our notations, the additional costs induced by moral hazard is
equal to (e   eh). The payment rule leads ex post to: eh = e ; 8h: There is no longer
moral hazard and the hospitals receive a payment (3) equal to the sum of the minimum
level of costs (a  e) and of the disutility of the optimal level of e¤ort '(e).
This ideal representation sets up the theoretical foundations of a fully prospective pay-
ment system. This model is based on rather unrealistic assumptions: homogeneity of
hospitals, homogeneity of patients for the same pathology, xed quality of care.
Many studies have underscored the great diversity in the conditions of care delivery
for hospitals (teaching status, share of low income patients, local wage level, etc.). For
instance, Pope (1990) shows that input prices can di¤er according to location, and that a
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hospital can be characterized by specic quality of services or severity of illness of admitted
patients. These studies point out the risks of a fully prospective payment system: patient
selection and lower care quality.
In order to avoid these drawbacks, many authors have tried to improve the basic model
by removing hypotheses such as patient and hospital homogeneity. (Keeler (1990), Pope
(1990), Ma (1994, 1998), Ellis (1998), La¤ont and Tirole (1993)). It is also possible to
consider extensions which introduce endogenous levels of number and quality of treatments
(Ma (1994), Ellis (1998), Chalkley and Malcomson (2000)). Using various theoretical
frameworks and hypotheses, some authors show that the social welfare can be improved by
a mixed payment system combining a lump-sum and a reimbursement of the actual cost of
treatment. However, the implementation of a mixed payment system is not straightforward:
the proportions of the lump-sum and the actual cost are dened very di¤erently, depending
on the theoretical model used, its main hypotheses and its parameterisation. Moreover, its
denition often relies on unobservable variables or functions (such as the e¤ort disutility
function, in La¤ont and Tiroles model).
In this paper, we consider an extension of the basic Shleifers model, where the regulator
is supposed to use the information available about observable sources of hospital cost
heterogeneity.
3.2 Extension of the basic model
Consider Ci;h; t the cost of stay i in hospital h during year t. We now suppose that the
sources of hospital cost variability are partially observable. The regulator is able to observe
the share eCiht of the costs which is linked to observable patient and hospital characteristics.
One has:
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Ci;h;t = X
0
i;h;tt +W
0
h;t+Q
0
 + ct| {z }eCiht
+ a  eh;t| {z }
 ht
: (4)
X 0i;h;t represents individual patient characteristics such as age-gender cross e¤ects, admis-
sion and discharge modes, length of stay. W 0h;t are observable hospital characteristics which
can vary over time: the hospitals ability to perform innovative procedures, the implemen-
tation rates of high-tech procedures, the rates of admission or discharge through transfer.
Q0h are observable hospital characteristics which do not vary over time, such as the type:
teaching, private not for prot or other public hospital.
In expression (4) the observed cost has two components: Ci;h;t = eCiht +  ht. The rst
one, eCiht; is the observable hospital cost heterogeneity: eCiht = X 0i;h;tt +W 0h;t+Q0 + ct.
The second one, denoted  ht; is equal to the cost heterogeneity considered by the basic
Shleifers model (see expression (1)), where eht is not observed by the regulator:
 ht = a  eht: (5)
Given these notations, the additional costs induced by moral hazard are, like in the basic
model, equal to (e   eht). Consider :
 h =
TP
t=1
P
k 6=h
 ht
TP
t=1
(Ht   1)
; (6)
where Ht is the number of hospitals observed in year t.
The payment rule is now dened by:
Piht = eCiht + '(e) +  h (7)
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Here,  h is dened8 so as not to be inuenced by  ht. Assuming that the explanatory
variables of eCiht are exogenous, i.e. that the hospital cannot manipulate their level in
reaction to the proposed payment, the result of the payment is a xed price contract. As
explained before, the average  h corresponds ex post to a situation with no moral hazard:
 h = a  e 8 h (8)
The payment rule leads ex post to: eht = e 8 h; t: There is no longer moral hazard. On
the basis of rule (7), each hospital receives a payment corresponding to the minimum level
of costs, for a given activity.
Each hospital breaks even with transfers Piht equal to:
Piht = X
0
i;h;tt +W
0
h;t+Q
0
h+ ct| {z }eCiht
+ '(e) + a  e (9)
4 Econometric specication of the cost function
When h are assumed to be random, the disturbance h + "h;t + ui;h;t has a ,
Our information is recorded at three levels (stays-hospitals-years), including the in-
dividual level of hospital stay.9 The transition to the econometric specication makes it
necessary to take into account disturbances which are linked to patientsand hospitals
unobserved heterogeneity, omited variables and measurement errors.
Theoretical model (4) thus becomes:
Ci;h;t = X
0
i;h;tt +W
0
h;t+Q
0
h+ ct + a+ h + "h;t + ui;h;t (10)
8Here  h is dened as an average computed over several years. This is to consider a denition in
accordance with the computation done in our empirical approach, where  h is dened over 4 years. Notice
that this doesnt change any prediction of the e¤ect of the payment rule, as soon as it is announced that
the computation of  h is updated every year.
9Therefore, our approach is di¤erent of papers which evaluate e¢ ciency using data relative to average
costs per hospital. A synthetic survey of this literature can be found in Linna (1998).
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In contrast to theoretical model (4), we consider in econometric specication (10) a
hospital specic e¤ect h; a hospital-year specic e¤ect "ht and a random error term at the
patient level ui;h;t. The structure of our data results in a nested structure of the disturbance,
which means that each each successive component of the error term is imbedded within the
preceding component. The random error term ui;h;t is assumed to be iid (0; u2): It takes
unobservable patient heterogeneity into account. "h;t is a disturbance supposed to be iid
(0; 2") and uncorrelated with ui;h;t: We provide below detailed interpretations of h and
"ht. Notice right here that the unobserved level of e¤ort eht; which appears in theoretical
model (5), is a component of the term h + "h;t:
As stated in the data section, the costs we observe result from an activity nanced
on the basis of a global budget system. Cost variability is therefore inuenced by several
factors: patient characteristics, hospital characteristics and ine¢ ciency.
Why should ine¢ ciency inuence our "real" data ? Because of the way the global
budget is implemented in France: as stated above in section 2:3, budgets have no direct
link to the actual production of hospitals and the budget constraint is rather soft. In fact,
ine¢ ciency is more or less possible, depending on the generosity obtained by the hospital
manager from the regulator when bargaining for the budget.
Given patient characteristics, cost variability can stem from hospital characteristics
such as hospital type (CHR, PRIV, PUB) and size, diversication of activities, quality of
services provided (performance of innovative procedures, comfort, alleviation of pain), skill
level of nurses and doctors, quality of hospital management. Some of these factors are
observable, some of them cannot be observed.
In this paper, we assume that the regulator has the same position as the econometrician.
More exactly, we assume that the regulator has an access to our database (the PMSI
database) to set the payments. Therefore, the sharing out of variables between observable
and unobservable components is the same for the regulator and the econometrician. The
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observable characteristics are the variables X 0i;h;t for the patients and the variables W
0
h;t
et Q0h for the hospitals: In (10), ct is a xed temporal e¤ect, which can be linked to
technological progress, the pace of price growth and the general trend of hospital budgets.
Given the observable characteristics, cost variability depends, in specication (10), on the
term:
h + "h;t + ui;h;t
4.1 Interpretation of hospital specic e¤ects h
The hospital specic e¤ects h can be assumed to be random or xed. These e¤ects al-
low us to specify the time-constant unobservable hospital heterogeneity. In our theoretical
framework, we have considered that the regulator has poor information about the cost re-
duction e¤ort provided by the hospital manager (moral hazard) but has information about
observable sources of hospital cost heterogeneity eCiht: However, the cost variability can
also be inuenced by unobserved hospital characteristics explaining its e¢ ciency (adverse
selection). Our theoretical framework considers only moral hazard. It does not address
the issue of designing an optimal contract to deal with adverse selection.10 Nevertheless,
the costs we observe are inuenced by unobserved hospital characteristics. Therefore we
include adverse selection parameters into our econometric specication.
Then, h can be seen as the result of three components :
h = 
as
h + 
mh
h + 
q
h:
The components of h are interpreted in the following way: 
as
h is an adverse selection
parameter. The hospitals activity is more or less costly, depending on its infrastructure
or on the existence of economies of scale or of scope.11 mhh represents long term moral
10On this issue, see for instance La¤ont and Tirole (1993).
11Finding evidence of links between hospital size (and diversication of activities) and the level of costs
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hazard: the hospital management can be permanently ine¢ cient. To provide an example
of bad functioning, we can think about an obsolete elevator which is very slow and subject
to frequent failures. Despite it should be replaced, this is not done during several years.
The term qh takes the time-invariant component of care quality into account. Transitory
variations in quality are rather unlikely: the sta¤ of public hospitals is binded to a unit. It
cannot be moved from one unit to another one, according to the needs. The civil servant
status involves rigidity in the hospital organization of work. Like for the sta¤, the public
hospital facilities cannot be modied very quickly. Any decision depends on a central
public administration. Thus, any modication of the quality of care in one public hospital
requires a sizeable delay to be implemented. Since our data covers a period of four years,
the possibility of a signicant upgrading of quality is rather limited.
4.2 Interpretation of "h;t
The disturbance "h;t is dened as the deviation, ceteris paribus, for a given year, of hospital
hs cost in relation to its average cost level. It can be seen as the result of two components:
"h;t = "
mh
h;t + "
tr
h;t
"mhh;t is an indicator of the e¤ect on costs of transitory cost-reducing e¤ort, i.e an indicator
of transitory moral hazard. For instance, the manager can be more or less rigorous when
bargaining prices for supplies or for services delivered to the hospital by outside rms.
The remaining part of "h;t should reect the ordinary components of any disturbance,
namely measurement errors and omitted transitory variables. Measurement errors are likely
to be of slight importance: "trh;t is replicated for each stay in the same hospital h during
the same year t. Within this framework, a measurement error can only be a systematic
entails the use of the SAE survey. However, information about the accurate indicators is available only
for a restricted number of observations in this survey. We did not nd any signicant results on these
observations.
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error in patient registration, or an error in hospital classication. These two possibilities
are unlikely. The other possible components of "trh;t, are omitted transitory variables such
as transitory variations in care quality or transitory shocks a¤ecting hospitals costs. We
have seen above that transitory signicant changes in quality are rather unlikely within
the organizational context of French public hospitals. On the other hand, any hospital
can be a¤ected by a shock in a given year. It may be, for instance, an electrical failure.
Within the implementation of a Prospective Payment System, we think that the regulator
would be well advised to classify a priori these incidents as moral hazard, in order to give
hospitals incentives to declare them, when the extra costs they induce are justiable and
exceptional. But such a regulation is not applied to the hospitals of our sample. In our
data, the variability of "trh;t can therefore be a¤ected by transitory unobserved shocks, the
importance of which has to be evaluated empirically, in order to identify the share of "h;t
due to short term moral hazard.
Given the facts that (i) measurement errors are likely to be negligible; (ii) "trh;t is mainly
inuenced by transitory shocks which are probably scarce, we think that the inuence of
"trh;t on the variability of "h;t is negligible. An econometric test based on the stochastic cost
frontier (SCF) approach gives an empirical support to this conjecture (see section 5.3).
Given this result, we can consider that the variability of "trh;t is negligible and interpret the
perturbation "h;t as an indicator of transitory moral hazard.
4.3 Denition of two methods of payment
Econometric specication (10) can be written as follows:
Ci;h;t = eCiht + a+ h + "h;t + ui;h;t ;
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where eCiht is the observable hospital heterogeneity. Consider the hospital-year means
dened by C:;h;t = 1Nh;t
Nh;tP
i=1
Ci;h;t, where Nht is the number of stays recorded in hospital h
in year t. Computing means at the hospital-year level eliminates the perturbation ui;h;t
linked to the sample distribution of stays (u:; h;t
P! 0 when Nht is large12). Therefore, one
has:
C:;h;t
P! eC:ht + a+ h + "h;t
In our theoretical model, we have Ci;h;t = eCiht+ ht and the optimal payment is dened
by (7): Piht = eCiht + '(e) +  h. In order to put this payment into practice, the regulator
has to establish a link between the theoretical concept  ht and the perturbations of the
econometric specication h + "h;t: In other words, he has to establish a link between the
additional costs induced by moral hazard  ht  h = e  eht and h+ "h;t: The arguments
presented above, together with our SCF analysis, allow us to consider that "h;t can be
interpreted as transitory moral hazard ("mhh;t ' "h;t). The main di¢ culty concerns the
hospital e¤ect: is h a legitimate hospital heterogeneity (which would be part of eCiht if
it were observable) ? Or is h long term moral hazard, which must be crushed by an
appropriate method of payment ? We have seen above that h can be seen as the result
of three components (h = 
as
h + 
mh
h + 
q
h) and that the moral hazard entails only one of
these components ( eht = mhh + "h;t): Given the fact that the components of h cannot
be identied separately, the regulator is reduced to considering two extreme cases, whether
h is supposed to be legitimate heterogeneity (
mh
h = 0 and  eht = "h;t) or to be entirely
due to moral hazard (h = 
mh
h and  eht = h + "h;t).
4.3.1 Taking or not unobservable hospital heterogeneity into account
In our theoretical model, the unobserved cost heterogeneity is equal to (5):  ht = a  eht:
As stated above, the regulator can consider two cases as regards the components of moral
12On average, Nh;t is equal to 77, with a minimum equal to 19 and a maximum equal to 250.
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hazard:  eht = "ht or  eht = h + "ht:
a) First method of payment
It relies on the assumption that hospital e¤ects h are linked to a legitimate hetero-
geneity. Given our notations, this comes down to suppose  eht = "ht. Thus:
 1ht = a+ "ht: (11)
The rule of payment is given by:
P 1i;h;t = X
0
i;h;t t + W
0
h;t +Q
0
h + ct + h + '(e
) +  1h ; (12)
with  
1
h dened by (6).
Assuming that hospitals keep the rent earned from more e¢ cient operations, they will
exert the optimal cost-reducing e¤ort e. Ex post, the following equality will thus be
veried :  
1
h = a  e:
With payment rule (12), the regulator takes the observable characteristics X 0i;h;t , W
0
h;t
and Q0h into account. In addition, the payment P
1 allows for permanent unobserved
hospital heterogeneity h, assuming that it is due to adverse selection or to the care quality.
Nevertheless, this payment method still gives incentives to hospitals : cost deviations
attributable to transitory moral hazard "ht are not reimbursed.
b) Second method of payment
The second method of payment is dened on the assumption that hospital e¤ects h
are entirely due to moral hazard. In this case,  eht = h + "ht and:
 2ht = a+ h + "ht (13)
P 2i;h;t = X
0
i;h;t t + W
0
h;t +Q
0
h + ct + '(e
) +  2h ; (14)
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This second payment rule takes observable patient and hospital characteristics into account,
but crushesunobserved heterogeneity h + "h;t. Implementing payment rule (14) comes
down to interpreting all unobserved hospital heterogeneity as resulting from moral hazard.
4.3.2 Evaluating the ex post payments
We have seen in section 3.2 that payment rule (7) leads each hospital to provide the rst best
cost reduction e¤ort e. Therefore, each hospital receives ex post a payment corresponding
to the minimum level of costs, for a given activity.
To evaluate the payments which can arise from the implementation of such a payment
rule and the corresponding potential budget savings, we must evaluate the level of costs
linked to an e¢ cient activity. Given our theoretical model the costs associated to an
e¢ cient activity are equal to the payments arising ex post when rule (7) is implemented.
The estimation of cost function (10) allows us to evaluate the costs associated to an
e¢ cient activity. However, the denition depends on the assumption relative to the com-
ponents of moral hazard.
a) First method of payment
h being considered as a legitimate heterogeneity, one can estimate the ex post payments
by:
^
P
1
i;h;t = X
0
i;h;t^t + W
0
h;t^+ Q
0
h
b+ c^t + ^h + a^+ Min
h;t
("^h;t + u^:;h;t) ; (15)
where we are using consistent estimates of the parameters and disturbances of model (10).
Under assumption (11) and assuming that the most e¢ cient hospital-year observation
corresponds to an e¢ cient activity (in other words, that the most e¢ cient hospital provides
the level of e¤ort e), Min
h;t
("^h;t) is a consistent estimate of the cost reduction obtained13
through the provision of e¤ort e: Thus: Min
h;t
("^h;t)
P! '(e) e: Then,
^
P
1
i;h;t is a consistent
13On our data, the maximal cost reduction is equal to '(e)  e and not  e. Indeed the most e¢ cient
hospital wants to be reimbursed for the e¤ort disutility '(e):
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estimator of the cost corresponding to e¢ cient activity. Indeed, the use of consistent
estimates of the model implies a^ P! a and u^:; h;t P! 0: Thus:

a^+ Min
h;t
("^h;t + u^:;h;t)

P! '(e) + a  e:
b) Second method of payment
If the hospital e¤ects h are entirely due to moral hazard, the ex post payments are
estimated by:
^
P
2
i;h;t = X
0
i;h;t^t + W
0
h;t^+ Q
0
h
b+ c^t + a^+ Min
h;t
(^h + "^h;t + u^:;h;t); (16)
where we are using consistent estimates of the parameters and disturbances of model (10).
Here, we assume again that the most e¢ cient hospital-year observation corresponds to
an e¢ cient activity (in other words, that the most e¢ cient hospital-year provides e). But
now we suppose that all the unobserved heterogeneity is resulting from moral hazard (13).
Then we compute the payment by taking as a reference point the hospital for which the
sum of unobservable characteristics h and transitory moral hazard "h;t is minimal. More
exactly, under (13), Min
h;t
(^h+ "^h;t) is a consistent estimate of the cost reduction obtained
through the provision of e¤ort e: Thus: Min
h;t
(^h + "^h;t)
P! '(e)   e: Then,
^
P
2
i;h;t is a
consistent estimator of the cost corresponding to e¢ cient activity. Indeed:

a^+ Min
h;t
(^h + "^h;t + u^:;h;t)

P! '(e) + a  e:
5 Estimation and results
We have chosen a linear specication for the cost function: the dependent variable is Ci;h;t
and not Log(Ci;h;t). It is well known that health care expenditures generally have a very
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asymmetric distribution. In our case, however, the distribution is truncated on the right
because of the selection of stays grouped in DRG 179 (uncomplicated AMI). More costly
stays are grouped in other DRGs: complicated AMI or AMI treated by bypass surgery.
The tests we have carried out on the distribution of Ci;h;t have led us to the conclusion
that it is closer to a normal than to a lognormal distribution. More exactly, normality tests
led to reject the null hypothesis for both C and Log(C): When we drop the 1% highest
observed costs, the skewness is closer to the normal for C (S = 0:509) than for Log(C)
(S =  1:117): Taking Log displaces the distribution to the left, leading to a negative
value of the skewness. In addition, one of the results presented above provides an ex post
justication of our specication choice: we nd that the estimates of "ht do not increase
on the raw scale as average hospital costs increase.14
5.1 Estimation methods and specication tests
In model (10) the hospital specic e¤ects h can be assumed to be random or xed. They
are linked to unobservable hospital characteristics: long term moral hazard, infrastructure,
care quality. These characteristics can be correlated with the explanatory variables. For
instance, care quality may be higher in a teaching hospital. Assuming that h is random
comes down to assuming that unobserved heterogeneity is not correlated with the observed
characteristics X 0i;h;t;W
0
h;t and Q
0
h.
A specication test15 led us to reject this hypothesis. Therefore, we specify h as a xed
14We thank one referee for this remark.
15See Dormont and Milcent (2004). This test is not quite straightforward because our panel data is
unbalanced in several dimensions: not only does the number of stays recorded vary across hospitals for
a given year but also the length of the observation period varies across hospitals. Therefore our three-
component error model (when h is random) is di¤erent from the unbalanced nested error component
model considered by Baltagi, Song and Jung (2001) and we have to use the maximum likelihood estimator
(MLE) dened by Antweiler (2001). To test for the independence of h , we have used an extension of
the specication test proposed by Mundlak (1978) for the standard error component model. Writting
the correlation between h and the explanatory variables as follows: h = X
0
:;h;:1 +W
0
h;:2 + h, where
h is iid (0; 
2
) and assumed to be uncorrelated with "h;t nor with ui;h;t, the independence test of h
is equivalent to the restriction test for H0 : 1 = 2 = 0 in the model (estimated by MLE): Ci;h;t =
X 0i;h;tt +W
0
h;t+X
0
:;h;:1 +W
0
h;:2 + a+ ct+ h   "h;t + ui;h;t| {z }
i;h;t
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e¤ect. In this case, the model includes hospital dummies and it is not possible to identify
parameters  which reect the inuence of time-invariant variables Q0h: Specication (10)
becomes:
Ci;h;t = X
0
i;h;tt +W
0
h;t+ a+ ct + h+ "h;t + ui;h;t| {z } (17)
This model is a standard error component model, with a disturbance equal to "h;t+ui;h;t. In
this case, feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) lead to a consistent and asymptotically
e¢ cient estimate if "h;t is not correlated with the explanatory variables.
Two specications were estimated, related to di¤erent lists of explanatory variables
W 0ht. Model (A) includes indicators close to veriable characteristics such as the variable
indicating whether or not the hospital is innovative and the average rates of admission and
discharge through transfers. Model (B) includes additional variables such as the rates of
use of innovative procedures, which can be more directly decided on by the hospital.
Tables 6 and 7 display the estimates of the models (A) and (B), and the associated
specication tests.
Hausmans tests allowed us to validate the hypothesis that e¤ects "h;t are not correlated
with the explanatory variables. Notice that the usual statistic of the Hausman test do not
allow to consider variables W 0ht. So, there is no di¤erence between the tests on models
A and B. This test (denoted Hausman test 1) is equivalent to a test for no correlation
between X 0i;h;t and "h;t. It led not to reject the null hypothesis (table 7).
To test for the exogeneity of W 0ht we used intrumental variables to build another Haus-
mans specication test (denoted Hausman test 2). Here, we compared the estimator known
to be consistent under the null and alternative hypotheses (the error component two-stage
least square estimator, EC2SLS (Baltagi, 1981)) with an estimator which is consistent and
e¢ cient under the null hypothesis (the feasible generalized least squares estimator, FGLS).
Instruments are the secondary diagnoses of the patient. A Sargan test has been imple-
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mented in order to check the validity of the instruments used for this Hausmans test. In
addition, we examined whether this test could be subject to the weak instrument problem
(Staiger and Stock, 1997). For this purpose, we tested for the signicance of the instruments
in several equations, where each instrumented variable is explained by the instruments and
the exogenous regressors. Hausman tests 2 led not to reject the null hypothesis for model
(A) and (B) and the Sargan tests did validate the exogeneity of the intruments (table 7).
In addition, we found a large signicance of the partial correlation between instruments
and endogenous explanatory variables, with high statistics16 and levels of signicance lower
than 10 3: All these tests validate the hypothesis that W 0ht are not correlated with "ht nor
uiht:
Given the fact that both e¤ects have components related to moral hazard, we had to
examine whether "ht could be correlated with the hospital e¤ects h: For that purpose, we
implemented a third Hausman test, comparing the FGLS applied to Ci;h;t = X 0i;h;tt+ a+
ct+ h+("h;t+ ui;h;t); where h is supposed to be xed and "h;t is supposed to be random
and not correlated to h nor the X
0
i;h;t, to the OLS applied to Ci;h;t = X
0
i;h;tt + a + ct +
h + "h;t + (ui;h;t); where h and "ht are supposed to be xed. The test relies on the fact
that the OLS applied to the second model are consistent even when the "h;t are correlated
to the h: This test led us not to reject the null hypothesis, with a Wald statistic equal to
23.2 and a p-value close to 1 (the corresponding 2 has a degree of freedom equal to 64).
All these tests provide evidence that we cannot reject the hypotheses that the variables
X 0i;h;t and W
0
ht are exogenous. Model (17) can be consistently estimated by the FGLS.
16For model (A), for instance, the Wald statistics to test the null hypothesis that the 8 instruments are
not signicant are equal to 559 for Innov, 116 for TI (rate of admission by transfer) and 751 for TX (rate
of discharge by transfer) . The corresponding p-values are lower than 0.000.
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5.2 Results
The estimated coe¢ cients of the individual characteristics X 0i;h;t are reported in table 6.
The inuence of individual stay characteristics are in accordance with the results generally
obtained when studying costs of stays for acute myocardial infarction. The most costly
stays are observed for men and cost is a decreasing function of age. One additional day
induces, ceteris paribus, an average additional cost of about 330-400 Euros. In addition,
the estimation of an incomplete specication using only individual patient characteristics
X 0i;h;t as explanatory variables reveals that 54.2 % of cost variability can be explained by ob-
servable patient heterogeneity. A payment system which would not take this heterogeneity
into account would give hospitals incentives to select patients.
Once we have taken permanent di¤erences in average costs into account through the
xed e¤ects model, we do not nd any signicant e¤ect of variable INNOV, nor of other
variables W 0ht:
The xed hospital e¤ects specication allows us to obtain consistent estimates of h
and "h;t and of their standard errors  and ": We have interpreted the disturbance "h;t
as an indicator of transitory moral hazard. Its inuence on cost variability is far from
negligible: its estimated standard error (373.4 or 391.6 - model A or B) is above 30 % of
estimated  (1213.2 or 1082.3).
To get an idea of the magnitude of the standard errors  and "; one can compare
them to the standard error of stay costs: 2,863 Euros (for an average cost equal to 4,198
Euros). In graphs 1 and 2, we relate estimated e¤ects ^h and "^h;t to the corresponding
average cost per hospital C:;h;: and average cost per hospital-year C:;h;t.17 The observations
have been sorted by increasing average cost. Hospital specic e¤ects are linked to average
costs per hospital but are far from explaining them entirely (graph 1). Graph 2 show that
the magnitude of the transitory moral hazard is not connected to the size of average costs,
17These graphs are shown for model A.
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giving an ex post justication to our linear specication.
5.3 SCF analysis
This analysis was implemented to give empirical support to the assumption that "ht is
entirely due to transitory moral hasard. The basic SCF approach relies on the canonical
"half normal" model (Greene, 2004), which uses a parametric specication in order to
identify the ine¢ ciency component. The disturbance is split into two components: a normal
one, related to statistical noises and a half normal component, related to ine¢ ciency. In
our case, we have: "h;t = "mhh;t + "
tr
h;t; where "
mh
h;t is the transitory moral hazard and where
"trh;t is linked to measurement errors and transitory shocks. The SCF specication relies on
the following assumptions:
"trh;t  N(0; 2"tr) and "mhh;t = jhtj ; with ht  N(0; 2 ): (18)
The asymmetry parameter,  =

"tr
gives an evaluation of the magnitude of the ine¢ -
ciency component. In section 4.2, we explained that 2"tr is likely to be negligible. If this
conjecture is right, one should nd 2"tr ! 0 and  !1: In this case, "h;t ' "mhh;t :
Consider model (17). It can be written as follows:
Ci;h;t = X
0
i;h;tt + vh;t + ui;h;t (19)
with : vh;t =W
0
h;t+ ct + h + "
mh
h;t + "
tr
h;t| {z }
"h;t
(20)
In a rst regression, we estimate (19), where the vh;t are specied as xed e¤ects and
where ui;h;t is supposed to be iid (0; 2u). Given our assumptions and the fact that Nht
is large enough, the vh;t can be consistently estimated by OLS. This rst step makes it
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possible to eliminate the patient dimension from the data variability and to get observations
at the hospital-year level.
In the second step, we use the rst-step estimates v^h;t and consider the SCF specica-
tion, assuming (18) to estimate (20) by the maximum likelihood estimator. This allows us
to identify the components of "ht:
Notice that the constant a has been deleted from the rst step regression (19). In second
step specication (20), the constant is taken by the hospital xed e¤ects into account
(there is no reference hospital). To avoid multicolinearity, we deleted one year dummy.
This treatment of the constant is adopted in order to avoid any a priori constraint upon
the distribution of hospital e¤ects h:
Our specication di¤ers from the basic versions of panel data formulation of the SCF
approach. In these versions, the ine¢ ciency is supposed to be time-invariant and reected
by the individual e¤ect (here, h). We think that this formulation is not appropriate in
our case. As stated repeatedly above, h is not only a¤ected by moral hazard, but also by
heterogeneity and care quality. These two factors can be symmetrically distributed. Our
three dimensional database allows us to consider a less constraining hypothesis.
The estimation of (20) by the maximum likelihood estimator (using the 95 observations
of the rst-step estimates v^h;t) led to: b"tr = 0:00025 and b = 605:7816: Thus b ! 1
( = 2:394  103): This result gives an empirical support to our conjecture that the
variability of "ht is entirely attributable to the transitory moral hazard. It was reasonnable
to expect that measurements errors had a negligible importance at the hospital-year level.
But we didnt know the share of the variability of "ht due to transitory shocks. This
parametric SCF analysis show that it is likely to be negligible too.
Table 8 displays the distribution characteristics of various xed e¤ects and disturbances
estimated in steps 1 and 2. It is interesting to notice that the hospital e¤ects ^h obtained
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in step 2 follow a normal distribution.18 This result suggest that this unobserved hospital
heterogeneity is likely to be more inuenced by adverse selection and di¤erences in care
quality rather than long term moral hazard. However, this interpretation needs further
empirical analysis to be conrmed.
6 Simulation of two methods of payment
Our econometric estimates encourage the implementation of a prospective payment system.
Indeed, our results have revealed that the transitory moral hazard is far from negligible. As
we have seen in section 4.3, the payment rule adopted by the regulator depends on whether
h is supposed to be legitimate heterogeneity or to be entirely due to moral hazard. In
the rst case, it is dened by (12), in the second by (14). Under the assumptions of the
theoretical model, these payment rules should give to each hospital an incentive to provide
the rst best cost reduction e¤ort, leading ex post to payments
(15) :
^
P
1
i;h;t = X
0
i;h;t^t + W
0
h;t^+ c^t + ^h + a^+ Min
h;t
("^h;t + u^:;h;t)
(16) :
^
P
2
i;h;t = X
0
i;h;t^t + W
0
h;t^+ c^t + a^+ Min
h;t
(^h + "^h;t + u^:;h;t)
We can simulate the implementation of the two payment rules on our data. The rst
method of payment exerts a softer constraint on hospitals than the second method of
payment. Indeed, payment P 2 ignores all unobserved heterogeneity (h + "h;t). With
payment P 1 the regulator takes the time-invariant unobservable heterogeneity (h) into
account, whether it is due to ine¢ cient management or to particularly good care quality.
18As we have seen above,
^
"h;t appears to be entirely half-normal.
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6.1 Potential budget savings
Table 9 gives the potential budget savings which can be expected from the implementation
of such payment rules.19 They are computed by measuring the di¤erence between total
costs Ciht and total ex post payments
^
P
1
i;h;t or
^
P
2
i;h;t. We can observe that the bracket
dened by P 1 and P 2 is quite wide: the payment rule P 1 leads to potential savings of
about 20 %; the payment rule P 2 leads to potential savings of between 51 % and 56 %,
depending on the model considered (B or A).
P 1 is indeed the least constraining payment system. Yet, it still leads to substantial
potential savings (20 %) because (i) it provides incentives to reduce the costs due to tran-
sitory moral hazard "h;t , (ii) the variability of costs due to transitory moral hazard is
sizeable. We thus recommend this method of payment. It avoids using the hospital with
the poorest care quality as a benchmark for cost. It takes permanent unobservable dif-
ferences of quality between hospitals into account. This strategy is advisable, given that
quality is a variable that cannot be veried by the regulator.
The next step is to determine which model should be used to establish payments.
- In our estimations and simulations, we have taken the length of stays into account.
Nevertheless, the type of payment system that we suggest implementing should not
be retrospective in the sense that it should be calculated by stay and not by day.
Therefore, we propose reimbursing on the basis of the estimated coe¢ cient of the
length of stay in the cost function multiplied by a suitable indicator of the length of
stay (an average indicator taking di¤erences in patient and hospital characteristics
into account).
- The main di¤erence between the models A and B is that model B integrates charac-
19Our simulation are carried out under the assumption that the estimated coe¢ cients remain unchanged
despite the payment reform.
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teristics such as the frequency of innovative procedures. The reason for integrating
procedure rates into the payment system is to avoid patient selection and skimping on
treatment. On the other hand, there is a risk of creating incentives for excessive use
of procedures (McClellan, 1997). We notice that all variables W 0ht are not signicant
when estimating xed e¤ects model (table 6) and that potential budget savings do
not di¤er when implemented on the basis of model A or B. It is interesting to notice
that taking into account heterogeneity through the hospital xed e¤ects lead to a non
signicant inuence of variables such as TI and TX (rate of admissions or discharges
through tranfers) as well as the frequency of innovative procedures. Indeed, these
variables can be manipulated by the hospitals in the short run. It should be more
di¢ cult for the hospitals to manipulate their own value of h , which derive from the
estimation process.
Table 10 records correlation coe¢ cients between costs and payments. A high correlation
rate means that the incentives for selecting patients are limited. We observe that substan-
tial budget savings displayed in table 9 are compatible with high correlation coe¢ cients,
especially in the between dimension, which is based on the yearly mean by hospital.
6.2 Share of retrospective payment in the rst method of payment
Payment method P 2 can be seen as a prospective payment, relaxed by the kind of risk
adjustment resulting from the fact that we take observable patient heterogeneity into ac-
count. On the other hand, the rst method of payment is partly retrospective because it
reimburses costs di¤erences due to the hospital e¤ects h:More exactly, one can distinguish
the following prospective and retrospective components of the rst method of payment:
^
P
1
i;h;t = X
0
i;h;t^t + W
0
h;t^+ c^t + a^+ Min
h;t
("^h;t + u^:;h;t)| {z }
Prospective=
^
F i;h;t
+ ^h|{z}
Retrospective
: (21)
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Let us consider the classical expression of a mixed payment as a weighted average of a
lump-sum F and the actual cost of treatment C : P = F +(1 )C: Using the expression
(21), one can compute i;h;t =
^
P
1
i;h;t Ci;h;t
^
F i;h;t Ci;h;t
.
We have obtained (for model A): ^ = 46; 2%; with a standard error equal to 12,9 %.
We have to underline that this sample mean (^) provides an evaluation which is not a rule
of payment. It results from an ex post computation, which allows us to know the weight
of retrospective payment induced by the implementation of payment rule P 1:
7 Conclusion
Hospital heterogeneity is a major issue in dening an optimal reimbursement system.
In this paper, we have considered an extension of the basic yardstick competition model,
allowing for the existence of observable sources of heterogeneity. We have applied an econo-
metric approach to the identication and evaluation of observable and unobservable sources
of cost heterogeneity. The use of a three dimensional nested database makes it possible to
identify transitory moral hazard, and to estimate its e¤ect on hospital cost variability.
In our specication, observable hospital characteristics and hospital specic e¤ects en-
able us to take hospital heterogeneity into account. We obtain two alternative payment
systems. The rst takes all unobservable hospital heterogeneity into account, provided
that it is time invariant, whereas the second ignores unobservable heterogeneity. Simu-
lations show that substantial budget savings - at least 20 % - can be expected from the
implementation of such payment rules.
The rst method of payment seems advisable to us: it has the great advantage of re-
imbursing high quality care. It leads to substantial potential savings, because it provides
incentives to reduce costs linked to transitory moral hazard, whose inuence on cost vari-
ability is far from negligible. Thus, our study shows that: (i) one component of moral
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hazard can be easily identied with three-level panel data: transitory moral hazard (ii)
this component of moral hazard is sizeable. Therefore, substantial budget savings can be
obtained from the implementation of a payment rule which eliminates only this component.
Moreover, this payment system is easy to implement, provided the regulator has infor-
mation about costs of hospital stays. One drawback is that it would give higher reimburse-
ments to hospitals which are costlier because of permanently ine¢ cient management. The
choice between the two methods of payment depends on the weights assigned to e¢ ciency
and care quality in the social objective function used by the regulator.
Our payment rules could be extended to other areas of health care nancing. Consid-
ering again the example of AAPCC to calculate Medicare Managed Care reimbursements,
our method would make it possible - not to identify the sources of geographical cost het-
erogeneity - but to identify the transitory moral hazard in the local-year dimension. If this
component of moral hazard has a sizeable inuence on cost variability, the savings derived
from eliminating it can be substantial.
In order to induce e¤ective budget savings, the implementation of our payment rules
requires the following: hospitals would have to earn the rents arising from improved e¢ -
ciency and they would have to face a hard budget constraint. What can be infered from
our simulations is limited by the fact that they are carried out under the hypothesis that
behaviors are supposed to remain unchanged except as concerns moral hazard. In other
words, hospitals are supposed not to adopt strategic behaviors in reaction to a reform of
the payment system. Moreover, our evaluations of the budget savings assume a constant
level of activity. Our nding of a potential saving of 20 % means that greater e¢ ciency
could have induced a saving of 20 % to nance the hospital activity observed during the
period 1994-1997. One important di¤erence between the PPS and the global budget is
that the level of activity is in principle not capped within the PPS. An increase in activity
could make hospital expenditures rise, even if hospitals progressed in e¢ ciency.
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